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Executive summary
Already difficult crime and order challenges in Papua New 
Guinea (PNG) are likely to deepen over the coming decade as 
social and economic change continues apace. But the main 
institution charged with fighting crime, the Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC), faces significant capability 
challenges and seems poorly placed and insufficiently 
resourced to meet the PNG Government’s 
stated expectations.
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This situation isn’t only bad for PNG; it also poses risks 
for Australian interests. The level of concern among both 
countries’ leaders was evident in 2013, when PNG requested 
and Australia agreed to an expanded contribution by the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP) in the cities of Port Moresby 
and Lae. This deployment aims to help the RPNGC, not 
replace it. Maintaining law and order in PNG will always be the 
responsibility of its own government and people.
RPNGC Constable and PNG–APP Advisor discuss a current investigation. Photo courtesy PNG–Australia Policing Partnership. 
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But just nine months into the new deployment, PNG’s Police 
Minister has flagged a review of the AFP presence, with a view 
to making major changes—and potentially even winding it 
down. It’s not clear why. One reason may be that the ‘visible 
policing’ aspect of the Wok wantaim (Working together) 
partnership isn’t meeting the very high expectations of it. 
Those expectations are unrealistic, because the AFP lacks 
immunities and legal powers to make arrests, conduct 
investigations or direct its RPNGC counterparts.
We see real value in bringing forward the major progress 
review that was already scheduled for late 2015, but doubt 
that it would find grounds to end the partnership. Rather, 
there are strong reasons to increase Australian investment 
in a program that’s slowly showing benefits and which, 
with some reconfiguration of the mission, could make a 
huge positive impact into the future and advance the two 
nations’ interests.
Cooperation among many agencies will be needed to address 
PNG’s crime challenges, but the long-term need is for large 
numbers of capable PNG police—not Aussie police. Outside 
help will remain critical to preparing them and the next 
generation of officers. While the RPNGC has many dedicated 
members, we see few signs that they, operating alone, will 
be able to turn the RPNGC into the force that its government 
expects and its people desire. Even if it receives the extra 
funding promised in August 2014, there would be little value 
in simply churning out more recruits from the Bomana Police 
College without sharp supervisors, accommodation to house 
them, or the corporate support to enable them to perform 
their duties.
This special report presents both governments with options 
for PNG–Australian police engagement over the next decade. 
As the task of building the type of police force expected 
is a generational one, we set out the case for establishing 
an enduring strategic partnership that can deliver the 
sustainable progress that the fluctuating collaborations of 
the past decade have been unable to provide.
The report’s key recommendation is to increase the size 
of the Australian commitment to the RPNGC to around 
$62 million per year if some conditions pertain. This amount 
would provide about 50–55 additional officers—some of 
whom may be ‘unsworn’ civilians or hired as contracted 
officers for the RPNGC—and broaden the emphasis of 
engagement from its current ‘publicly visible’ focus to include 
supporting roles.
This change would allow more resources for training support, 
including travelling teams to coach police at the provincial 
level, and provide more overseas training and secondment 
opportunities for RPNGC officers. Extra support to improve 
training facilities and outcomes, while necessary but 
insufficient to promote change in the RPNGC, is a practical 
form of AFP assistance.
The package would retain mentors in police stations, perhaps 
in the form of police contracted to the RPNGC, and support 
for specialised squads, including the Family and Sexual 
Violence Unit. It would also provide more support to key 
‘back office’ functions, like contracting. 
Further initiatives to help the RPNGC modernise should 
be undertaken regardless of the size of the future AFP 
contribution. These include increasing the international 
contribution to building the RPNGC, increasing the number 
of female RPNGC officers and providing them with better 
support, and working to enhance governance, data collection 
and constructive links to business and the community. A 
welfare unit, to look after the health and wellbeing of officers 
and their families, should also be raised and resourced. 
Genuine acceptance by the RPNGC of the criticality of 
accountability, and of international assistance, would be 
needed to make this package work.
Given the multidimensional nature of this support, and the 
importance of coordinating Australian efforts generally, the 
whole police program should come under the authority of 
Australia’s high commissioner in PNG. 
Continuing and enhancing cooperation between PNG and 
Australian police is in the interests of both countries. What 
would particularly help now is a clear statement of political 
support by Australian and, especially, PNG leaders, so that 
this enduring cooperation can be maintained and grown 
without ambiguity.
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A renewed partnership
Building effective law and order has been a consistent but 
elusive priority of successive Papua New Guinea (PNG) 
Governments. In July 2013, during negotiations to reopen 
the Manus Island detention centre, Prime Minister Peter 
O’Neill asked the Australian Government to provide another 
50 Australian Federal Police (AFP) officers—on top of the 
existing program—to work in visible policing roles. The 
additional AFP officers began deploying in November 2013 
and are currently working in Port Moresby and Lae with the 
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC).
After only nine months, PNG ministers have publicly and 
privately expressed a desire to re-evaluate this program. 
Although a formal review was already planned for mid-2015, 
we’d welcome an earlier opportunity to ensure strong and 
unambiguous support for future cooperation.
As the extra police were deployed very quickly to meet both 
governments’ political imperatives, the review will provide 
a chance to address important questions for both countries. 
What should police cooperation and engagement look like 
into the future? What do the PNG Government and the RPNGC 
want and need? What’s the best way to deliver that support, 
and how much should Australia provide?
To help inform thinking in the lead-up to the review, this 
special report explores the impact of crime in PNG, the needs 
of the RPNGC, and Australia’s interests in improving the 
RPNGC’s ability to combat crime. Based on that analysis, we 
suggest some crucial principles for framing the coming review 
and recommend a set of specific options for consideration.
The options can be tailored to suit Port Moresby’s appetite 
and Canberra’s pockets, but they’re necessarily constrained 
by the facts on the ground. The RPNGC faces deep, complex 
and systemic challenges that will resist simple solutions. And 
PNG decides what help it requests and accepts. So some 
aspirations for the AFP to be granted executive policing 
powers—which include powers to arrest Papua New Guinean 
suspects, conduct investigations and direct less senior 
RPNGC officers—need to be tempered with the realities of 
PNG law and sovereignty.
 
What could this partnership produce?
This report necessarily refers to the RPNGC’s shortcomings, but we’ve tempered our criticism by explaining the situation 
that PNG officers work in. It’s not fair to blame all the force’s problems on individuals (there are many hardworking 
and dedicated people in the RPNGC’s ranks—we’ve met a number). Nor is it fair to lay all the blame on an organisation 
that’s been severely under-resourced for 40 years. Similarly, we’ve heard people say the AFP is ‘doing nothing’ in PNG. 
That’s wrong.
We’ve also heard that more could be done with the resources available. This report’s been written to find ways to do 
just that.
There are already cases where Wok wantaim has produced real results. In Lae, we saw a great example of this cooperation. 
Police station cells in PNG are inhospitable places, and the treatment of people in custody generates many complaints each 
year. Working together, the RPNGC commander in Lae and the AFP team scoped major changes, including a computerised 
cell management system and new facilities. This will include a separate cell for juveniles and a women’s area. The cells have 
been cleaned and painted. They’ll be refurbished soon.
The business community’s involvement in this project has been important. By cooperating with the Lae Chamber of 
Commerce, the police have received arm’s-length donations from businesses and charities for the refurbishment. A 
computer programming course at the local university has developed the cell management program, and the lecturer is the 
help desk: his mobile number is on the box.
All of that cost the Australian taxpayer one desktop computer and some good thinking by those involved. What the RPNGC 
will gain is hard to measure yet, but it’s sure to be highly beneficial and probably sustainable, given the local support.
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Our report is based on more than 80 interviews with experts, 
officials, police, business figures and academics in Port 
Moresby, Lae and Canberra. It also draws on research into the 
crime and order situation in PNG by the PNG and Australian 
governments, international institutions and scholars. 
Fieldwork for this project was undertaken with the financial 
support of OmniExec, and the PNG–Australia Policing 
Partnership helped facilitate some meetings in PNG.
In developing the options for a future engagement program, 
we’ve addressed some of the desires expressed by PNG Police 
Minister Robert Atiyafa in his speech of late August 2014 
(but not some of his larger ambitions, such as the proposed 
air and maritime components for the RPNGC). The speech 
underlined the O’Neill government’s commitment to policing, 
promised extra funds and flagged an ambitious package of 
intended goals and measures. But, as the government and 
the RPNGC attempt to implement that commitment, they’ll 
be challenged by internal constraints and the increasingly 
tough external environment.
The challenges facing PNG and Australia—
and their police
Obstacles to the RPNGC’s ability to deliver policing services 
to its community, and to act as a critical enabler of political 
stability and economic and social development, mirror 
realities and pressures in the society of which it’s a part. The 
RPNGC is embedded within the law and justice sector (see 
box), the broader governance system, the political system, 
the national economy, and a diverse society of 800 or more 
distinct cultures. Like other institutions of the state, it faces a 
complex and changing environment.
PNG is a rugged, relatively young and geographically 
dispersed developing country of more than 7 million people. 
So addressing crime and building law enforcement bodies 
to fight it won’t be a simple matter of better training and 
equipment. The coexistence of formal and informal systems 
means that long-term, comprehensive engagement between 
PNG society and donors will be critical, as they’ll both be 
adapting simultaneously to current and developing standards 
and values. It also means that the RPNGC won’t look exactly 
like a Western police force—and it won’t be the only source 
of law and order in PNG. Traditional forms of authority will 
continue to exist, too.
However, reflecting our concern about challenges to 
Australian and PNG national interests, our options for 
future engagement focus on addressing crime through the 
formal institution of the RPNGC. That means that we make 
only cursory analysis of village courts, auxiliary police and 
other features of justice in rural areas—where the bulk of 
the population lives—except where disorder, gender-based 
violence and similar problems challenge the authority, 
effectiveness, and reach of the PNG state.
Nor do we focus much on customary restorative justice 
practices and informal community-based apparatus for 
conflict resolution. Many experts stress the need to harness 
such mechanisms, given the weakness of the PNG state, 
tensions between ‘imported’ governance models and local 
ways of doing things, the limited legitimacy and reach of the 
state compared to other sources of authority, and the patchy 
results of past institution-strengthening.
But the emergence of a more capable, professional and 
responsive RPNGC is a very necessary condition for improved 
justice outcomes, even if it won’t be sufficient. Despite the 
limitations of previous police capacity-building, technical 
fixes and skills-transfer efforts, the RPNGC isn’t beyond help. 
And it will remain central to routine responses to crime. 
Improved policing would also address transnational and 
other crimes of particular concern in ways community-based 
measures won’t. Moreover, one country’s efforts to assist a 
sensitive sovereign responsibility of another will necessarily 
be fairly institutional. Thus, our report is firmly situated in the 
criminal justice system.
We see great value in Australia’s support to other parts of 
PNG’s broader law and justice sector, including its informal 
elements. Indeed, we focus on recommendations for future 
police cooperation conscious that enhanced legal, judicial, 
governance, customs, defence, transport security and other 
partnerships will be essential to realise any gains in improved 
policing. This will be needed because the main crime types 
that challenge PNG will require a broad range of treatments, 
of which the police are only one.
Crime types
For simplicity, the wide variety of inter-related forms of crime 
facing PNG can be divided into five categories.
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The PNG law and justice sector
The PNG Government takes a ‘sector’ approach to coordinating the eight departments and agencies of its law and justice 
sector. These function within a messier reality a wider system of formal and informal actors, none of which can be fully 
effective if the others aren’t performing well, but all of which face their own complex impediments.
PNG Law and Justice Sector
National Coordinating Mechanism
PNG Non-government and community partners (including community crime prevention, the private security industry)
Statistics: drawn from the Law and Justice Sector 2013 Annual Performance Report
Law and Justice Working Group
PNG Government Ministerial Committee
Royal Papua New 
Guinea 
Constabulary 
(RPNGC)
Investigate
and prepare brief
Delivers policing 
services
Administers legal 
services 
(including parole, probation, 
juvenile justice, village courts, 
land mediation 
administration, 
restorative justice)
Prepares and tries 
cases against alleged 
criminals
Provides legal aid 
and advice to those 
needing help
Supports the 
Judiciary in cases 
before the Supreme 
& National Courts
Provides the 
community a District 
Court accessible to 
all
Enforces the 
sentences of 
courts, detaining 
inmates
Impose penalty and 
rehabilitate
Administer, hear, and determine cases (from decision to 
charge; to commencement of proceedings; committal; 
hearing; trial, sentencing; and appeals)
Department of 
Justice and 
Attorney General 
(DJAG)
National Judicial 
Staff Services 
(NJSS)
Office of the 
Public 
Prosecutor 
(OPP)
Public 
Solicitor’s 
Office (PSO)
Magisterial 
Service (MS)
Correctional 
Service (CS)
Interim 
Anti-corruption 
Task Force
Task Force 
Sweep
Guards against 
abuse of power & 
breaches of  
obligations by 
leaders/officials
PGK 351 m
(51% of sector)
PGK 38 m
(8% of sector)
PGK 7 m
(1% of sector)
PGK 10 m
(2% of sector)
PGK 90 m
(13% of sector)
PGK 54 m
(8% of sector)
PGK 95 m
(14% of sector)
PGK 17 m
(3% of sector)
6,098 staff
(5,724 police,
374 civilian, not 
including Reservists/ 
Auxiliary)
381 staff
(82 legal and 299 
non-legal officers)
77 staff
(44 legal and 33 
non-legal officers)
158 staff
(71 legal and 87 
non-legal officers)
714 staff
(30 judges and 
684 other 
officers)
510 staff
(93 magistrates and 
417 support staff and 
registry)
1,355 staff
(1,328 uniformed 
and 27 civilians 
and casuals)
92 staff
Ensure 
independent 
oversight
Ombudsman 
Commission (OC)
Key actors within the bureaucracy include the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, two anticorruption bodies 
(one of which has been disestablished by the government but resurrected by the courts), and the Correctional Service. 
They’re supported by judicial bodies, including the courts and prosecutors, and oversight mechanisms such as the 
Ombudsman Commission. Also important are the village courts, which employ customary methods of mediation and 
conflict resolution to maintain peace and harmony within the community. The PNG Defence Force, which sits outside 
the law and justice sector, and the Correctional Service (which with the RPNGC make up the disciplined services) can be 
called out in aid of the civil power or during a state of emergency to help preserve or restore order.
Informal participants, including private security companies protecting premises, goods, services and infrastructure, 
neighbourhood watches, community and advocacy groups, faith-based organisations, and the largely self-regulating 
rural communities are important because of the limited reach of government authority and strong traditional and 
commercial imperatives for security and justice.
The demarcation between the formal and informal parts of the sector is, of course, quite fuzzy. For example, police are 
often involved in open-air community mediations.
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Very high rates of petty crimes against the person and 
property are regularly identified in community surveys 
as being of greatest concern to most people. Hold-ups, 
carjackings, assaults and other offences, sometimes by 
groups of underemployed young men known as raskols, are 
often accompanied by serious violence. They’re are fuelled 
by lack of opportunity in the formal economy, the high cost 
of living in urban areas, rising inequality, rapid social change, 
and corroded versions of some traditional social norms 
and values.
Endemic violence against women forms a distinct sub-
strand of crime against the person. Some 12% of households 
report domestic violence each year.1 A recent article by Jo 
Chandler described the economic, social and cultural drivers 
of family and sexual violence in PNG. She argues too many 
men are ‘getting away with murder’ and that high levels of 
impunity contribute to the pervasive culture of violence.
Pervasive corruption is a driver that operates at many 
levels. It can allow perpetrators to bribe their way out of 
trouble at various stages in the legal process, even if formal 
investigations are launched and cases are brought against 
them. There’s also an increasing strand of corruption that 
involves the theft of significant amounts of government 
money. This means that corruption is moving illegality up 
the ‘value tree’ in PNG, as economic development stemming 
from major resource projects offers new opportunities for 
fraud, illegal kickbacks and white collar crime—with powerful 
figures sometimes using raskol gangs as their foot soldiers.
And, in a globalised world, corrupt business and political 
figures are increasingly connected with transnational 
criminals and money launderers. This dark side of PNG’s 
otherwise welcome international links and economic growth 
provides added incentive for foreign criminals to regard PNG 
as a viable and profitable place to do business. For example, 
the increasing volume and value of legitimate traffic through 
PNG’s ports, airports and banks will likely provide further 
cover for the trafficking of weapons, natural resources, 
prescription and illicit drugs, and other contraband.2
Finally, although there’s no sign of the sort of separatism that 
wracked Bougainville from 1988 to 1998 emerging elsewhere, 
PNG faces various public order challenges. Tribal fighting, 
which was a feature of ordinary life in parts of the precolonial 
highlands, re-emerged in the 1960s and was increasing 
before independence in 1975. Today, large fights, mainly over 
land issues that may go back decades, involve hundreds of 
warriors using military, high-powered and homemade guns. 
Intergroup clashes on the outskirts of cities and towns stem 
from friction as newer settlers from ‘outside’ groups are 
blamed for taking work and causing crime. Sites near some 
mining and other resource projects attract large influxes 
of people hoping for riches, but whose lives become even 
more precarious in frontier towns. Some become involved 
in threatening compensation demands. Within PNG’s cities 
and towns, rowdy protests occasionally flare into serious 
situations, as occurred during anti-Asian riots in 2009.
The extent and trajectory of crime
Although evidence about PNG crime is often anecdotal, 
experts and officials have monitored it closely for decades, 
gathering much qualitative and some quantitative data.
In systematically assessing indicators across countries, 
Transparency International, for example, rates PNG as 
‘highly corrupt’ and ranks it among the bottom third of 
nations surveyed. Similarly, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money 
Laundering used a standard comparative assessment to 
report in 2011 that PNG faces very serious risks from money 
laundering.3 The World Bank rated Port Moresby and Lae two 
of the unsafest cities in the world in 2010, on the basis of their 
33 and 66 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. 
Regular surveys of community, business and investor 
confidence, as well as academic studies, support widespread 
perceptions that the country is badly affected by violence 
and crime.4
Surveys, expert studies and media commentary also suggest 
that important types of crime are becoming more brazen, 
prevalent and deeply entrenched. As several long-term 
PNG-watchers put to us, the doom-and-gloom scenarios 
haven’t been fulfilled but the overall trend is downward. 
And key pressures behind that trend—such as population 
growth, rapid urbanisation, enmeshment with neighbouring 
economies, and the gap between galloping 20% GDP growth 
but slowing street-level economic activity (as revenue from 
liquefied natural gas kicks in but construction trails off)—are 
more likely to continue than end that trajectory.
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Impacts of crime
A recent ANZ Insight on capturing the benefits of PNG’s 
resource endowment and location in the Asian century warns 
that the country’s enormous potential is undercut by the 
twin threats of poor governance and crime and corruption. 
A just-released six-part World Bank study on the impacts 
of crime in PNG shows that, while crime imposes huge 
direct transactional and enforcement costs, its indirect 
and intangible longer term social impacts are what limit 
companies from operating to their full potential. PNG’s 
reputation for violence and corruption, and the matching 
reality, constrain investment and growth—fear reinforces a 
negative cycle in which unemployment and crime affect the 
whole society. Sixty-seven per cent of businesses surveyed—
more than four times the regional average—told the World 
Bank that crime constrained their investment or expansion.
Crime also undercuts legitimate firms and drives them out 
of business, especially where organised gangs can infiltrate 
and exploit poor government control or bribe leaders and 
officials. Corruption also plays a role here by reducing the 
government’s revenue through lost tax receipts, funds being 
diverted offshore and the need for increased expenditure 
on security. These problems have corrosive effects on 
institutions and create tensions between those who want 
to increase the efficiency of the police and courts and those 
with an interest in perpetuating weak controls.
Even seemingly ‘victimless’ crimes can scar lives far from 
the major cities where they are committed. Officials taking 
a cut of a large government contract can result in poor (or 
sometimes no) services being delivered, for example when 
roads are built (or not); the distribution of ineffective or 
dangerous counterfeit products, such as medicines; and 
licences being issued for unsustainable logging and fishing 
activities that harm communities. Even when illicit goods 
and services shipped through PNG aren’t consumed in the 
country, that traffic can still have a corrosive effect because it 
promotes corruption.
Crime is expected to become more of a problem for PNG 
over the next 10 years. This will test the country’s legislative, 
preventive, investigative and prosecutorial capacity—and its 
traditional systems of authority—especially as PNG tries to 
keep pace with new criminal methods, such as synthetic drug 
manufacture, cybercrime and crime using modern weapons. 
PNG’s ability to maintain the pace is critical to other nations 
in the region because the impact of these crimes can be felt 
across borders.
Australia’s interests in PNG’s crime and 
order situation
Over recent years, money laundering through PNG has 
been the major criminal concern for PNG and Australian 
authorities. Jason Sharma notes that the amount of aid 
that flows north is ‘more than matched’ by the illicit funds 
that flow south, although he can’t quantify the southward 
flow.5 In addition, illicit drugs have been seized transiting 
through PNG on their way to Australia from Asia and Central 
America. While PNG doesn’t rank among our major sources 
of contraband, law enforcement officials warn that they have 
an incomplete understanding of this but they suspect that 
the impact is rising. Australian law enforcement agencies will 
undoubtedly respond to these direct impacts where they can, 
but, as in PNG, the many indirect impacts of crime probably 
engage our interests as much as direct ones. 
We’re well served by a sovereign, prosperous and successful 
PNG, given its proximity and location across our direct 
approaches, strong historical and personal bonds, continuing 
trade and investment links, international commitments 
and expectations that we’d assist in the event of instability 
on the other side of Torres Strait. This basic position has 
been supported by close Australian engagement over many 
years—by government through development and security 
assistance, by business though investment, and by the 
community through charities and personal ties.
Australian business interests in PNG total around $20 billion, 
which makes PNG one of the largest destinations for 
Australian investment, and the country’s crime and order 
situation increases risks to those interests. Given Canberra’s 
focus on ‘economic diplomacy’, using aid to promote trade 
and being responsive to partner countries’ priorities (law and 
order is one of Port Moresby’s four development ‘pillars’), any 
factor with such scope to undermine PNG’s potential affects 
our interests too.
Canberra also has consular responsibilities for the nearly 
10,000 Australians who live in PNG, many of whom manage 
the investments mentioned above.
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Our past and present defence and security policies have 
placed PNG high on the list of priorities for Australia. It 
isn’t a big step from aiming to prevent any foreign power 
dominating PNG to wanting to help PNG prevent its 
sovereignty and security being undermined by other actors, 
such as criminal groups.
Australia also has an important interest in ensuring that 
PNG remains a responsible member of the international 
community. In particular, there’s an interest in helping PNG 
to maintain the integrity of its financial system, its passports 
and its border traffic. Its proximity to Australia makes 
cooperation on matters such as transnational crime a logical 
extension of the broader national interest.
It’s also important to think about the future. PNG’s 
population has already trebled since independence and is 
set to double again by 2050. Add a modernised road and air 
network, probably opening up the country’s southern areas 
nearest to Australia, and PNG will become more open to 
domestic and international influences. Crime will follow new 
opportunities like these.
Australian Governments also express an emotional 
responsibility to PNG. As well as stating that Australia would 
never allow PNG to become a ‘failed state’, Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop has spoken of a deep affection for its people. 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott has described the two countries 
as ‘family’, and many probably share that sentiment.
Added to these historical, personal and humanitarian 
links is the fact that PNG asks for our help and specifically 
sought the additional police as one of its requests under 
the Joint understanding on further bilateral cooperation on 
health, education and law and order in return for helping 
with Manus.
The sheer scale of Australia’s assistance to PNG—$577 million 
in aid in 2014–15—also creates a strong interest in ensuring 
that economic and societal development isn’t undermined 
by crime. For that reason, around 13% of our aid to PNG is 
invested in its law and justice sector through four major 
programs (see Appendix A).
The RPNGC and its key needs and 
challenges
The RPNGC numbers around 6,000 sworn and unsworn 
members, plus reserves and auxiliaries. This makes it a 
very small force when the size of PNG’s population and 
the complexity of the nation’s geography are considered 
(see Appendix B).
Despite major problems, the RPNGC has maintained order 
in its broadest sense and developed an infrastructure for 
policing across the nation. But the organisation attracts 
strong criticism for the way it performs its role, and the 
difficulties faced by police in PNG are systemic, formidable 
and confronting.
The major problems for the RPNGC seem to stem from the 
inability of its officers to put their training into practice 
because of a complex mix of resourcing, cultural and 
accountability challenges. In short, they know what to do 
but too often have trouble doing it. That’s not unusual in 
developing countries, but it means that the RPNGC now 
has a reputation for violence, corruption and occasionally 
extortion. It also means that basic policing resources such as 
radios, computers, vehicles and even fuel are in short supply 
and that facilities are basic and poorly maintained.
The uneven spread of training, particularly in more complex 
policing roles, is another factor. The RPNGC has difficulty with 
investigative techniques, securing evidence, and pursuing 
convictions against members of tightknit communities. 
Under these conditions, officers tend to respond to crime 
and disorder reactively and punitively. However, dispensing 
rough justice reinforces a negative cycle that makes the 
trust required for community policing all the more elusive. It 
also makes complaints against the RPNGC common, which 
creates a burden for the budget when PNG courts award 
damages to settle complaints against the force.6 And people 
are discouraged when the bad behaviour of RPNGC officers 
isn’t punished, as is often the case.7
These factors provide the ‘problem statement’ for the RPNGC 
Modernisation Program and the government’s recently 
announced aspirations (see box).
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This special report isn’t a comprehensive needs analysis 
of the RPNGC—we’ve built on earlier reports, discussions 
with Commissioner Geoffrey Vaki and senior police officers, 
interviews with others with knowledge of the RPNGC, and the 
Police Minister’s aspirations for modernisation. But it’s safe to 
assert that a comprehensive rebuild of the RPNGC is needed 
and desired. While the list of needs is long and perennial, it’s 
worth highlighting a few specifics:
• Policing in partnership with the community. To work 
with the community, the RPNGC will need assistance to 
build discipline and enhance its training and supervisory 
system (key priorities for Commissioner Vaki). It will 
need to correct the massive gender imbalance in the 
constabulary, and the direct police–community interface 
will also require attention. Better data on crime and the 
police will make an important contribution to helping the 
community, and indeed quantify most of the RPNGC’s 
other needs.
 
The RPNGC Modernisation Program
The RPNGC Modernisation Program was initiated in 2013 as a five-year ‘intervention strategy to rebuild the RPNGC and 
improve the delivery of police services’. Through this program, the RPNGC aims to be recognised by the government, the 
people of PNG and the region as the leader of policing in the Pacific region within 40 years. It’s main goals are:
•  Maintain law and order in partnership with the community
•  Improved investigation, detection and prosecution of offences
•  A well-equipped and professional police service
•  A highly professional and accountable organisation.
To implement these goals, $123 million was quarantined in the RPNGC’s operating budget. This money has been set 
aside to pay the salary costs of increased recruitment, provide additional housing for new recruits, build new facilities at 
Bomana Police College, build a provincial police training centre in Lae, and renovate Boroko police station in Port Moresby 
and provincial cells. The RPNGC also intends to create ‘model police establishments’ at Port Moresby, Lae, Mt Hagen and 
Kopoko (East New Britain).
Since then, the PNG Government has outlined an even more ambitious set of proposals to modernise the RPNGC, tagging 
this as ‘Marching to Modernisation’. Police Minister Atiyafa said that PNG will face more law and order problems, and that 
the RPNGC’s infrastructure had gone from bad to worse. He spoke of the need for an ‘emergency surgical operation’ to 
improve the force.
To achieve that, Atiyafa outlined the government’s intention to spend $1.3 billion over the next five years to make the 
RPNGC ‘comparable to any police force in the modern world’. This will include rebuilding Bomana College, recruiting and 
training initiatives, new housing and stations, a joint college, and new communications and IT infrastructure. New squads 
will be formed, including one for public affairs, and village-level law and order would be boosted. Also on the agenda 
is legislative change over land planning and the Police Act, and a transfer of responsibility for police housing to district 
members of parliament. A new fleet of 2,000 vehicles, 12 helicopters, two fixed-wing aircraft and watercraft—all available 
24/7 anywhere in PNG—was promised.
Atiyafa wants to see more PRNGC officers trained overseas, and also to review how the AFP is currently assisting the 
RPNGC. He also highlighted the intention to contract ‘expatriate police officers’ so they can operate under PNG laws and 
so assist in front-line and investigative police work. He sees them being based in provincial police headquarters and in 
districts for training and advice. It’s a bold plan, but one that’s not yet in the budget.
Sources: RNPGC 2013 Budget and Program Implementation Plan; ‘Speech at the announcement of national government’s approval of major policy 
projects for the constabulary’ by Police Minister Robert Atiyafa, 29 August 2014; ‘Speech at the opening of four new buildings at Hohola Police 
Station’ by Atiyafa, 3 September 2014.
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It’s difficult to say how much it will cost to fund an effective 
RPNGC. While the cost of the current policing effort has been 
quantified at around $178 million in the PNG Budget, we can’t 
be sure whether achieving a sound policing outcome would 
cost two or three times that amount, or more. What’s evident 
is the desired policing outcomes won’t be achieved in the 
short term, or without substantial external support.
Australian cooperation and engagement 
with the RPNGC
Crime and policing have long been priority areas in the 
Australia–PNG relationship. Our support has included direct 
assistance through AusAID, which has now been subsumed 
into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), and 
support by the AFP for various programs (see Appendix C).
For example, police–police cooperation through the AFP’s 
International Network involves the posting of a senior liaison 
officer to the Australian High Commission in PNG. The officer 
facilitates information exchanges, participates in the PNG’s 
intelligence group that monitors the Torres Strait, helps 
PNG to retain its conduit to INTERPOL, and supports other 
Australian initiatives in PNG. An additional officer provides 
support to the Transnational Crime Unit.
There’s also direct interaction between the police forces. 
This ranges from temporary and ad hoc deployments of 
officers for investigations and dignitary protection to major 
deployments, such as the 1989–2004 cooperation program, 
the 2004–05 Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP), and the 
current program.
Through AusAID/DFAT and the AFP, Australia has also 
provided significant development assistance to the RPNGC 
over time. This began as AusAID-led programs in 1988 and 
has recently included funding for training, governance, 
facilities, including a ‘model’ station at Boroko, a rewrite of 
constabulary standing orders, and support to counter family 
and sexual violence.
The key focus of bilateral police engagement today is the 
latest phase of the PNG–Australia Policing Partnership 
(PNG-APP). This program started in 2008 and has grown in 
phases since then. The most recent phase involves placing, 
since last December, an additional 50 AFP officers as advisers 
• Improved police skills. Better police skills will enhance 
human rights, and allow the RPNGC to produce briefs 
of evidence and bring more cases to court. The force 
needs specialist training in areas such as fraud and 
anticorruption, and resourcing for its major specialist 
squads. Most of the squads, which include fraud and 
anticorruption8, sexual offences, family and sexual 
violence, intelligence and organised crime, run on very 
low levels of resourcing, according to some interviewees. 
This reduces their effectiveness. Perhaps the best 
resourced unit, the Special Services Division (SSD, 
better known as the mobile squad), should also receive 
assistance to increase its options for dealing with public 
order problems and to reduce its use as a hired force.
• Equipment and development. A professional force has 
needs that begin in recruiting and training but extend to 
equipment and facilities. Obtaining enough recruits for 
the force will pose challenges in selection and training, 
which will flow through to supervision, housing and 
professional development in due course. Improving the 
funding process, which will mean ensuring a consistent 
flow of money to operational outfits as well as attention 
to the ‘leakage’ that occurs as money moves downwards, 
will be critical.
• Accountability and professionalism. Perhaps the 
most important need is to create an accountable and 
professional organisation. To achieve this, the RPNGC will 
need leadership stability, respect for its independence, 
a functioning system of discipline and oversight, and 
a welfare system for police and their families. This last 
need currently receives little attention but will be critical 
to ensuring that officers who’ve been the victims or 
perpetrators of violence receive treatment. Together with 
discipline, this might help change some aspects of RPNGC 
behaviours that we’re told are often not conducive to 
good policing.
It’s also worth mentioning that the needs of the RPNGC can 
differ dramatically from location to location, and that the 
impacts of those needs are felt not only in the RPNGC but in 
the communities it serves. Nor are any of the needs in this 
list new (many date from before or soon after independence): 
that they persist suggests a need for caution about proposals 
for the future.
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recent Australian governments. In PNG, lawsuits involving key 
leaders, leadership turmoil in the RPNGC, and interference in 
anticorruption efforts shape the environment of the mission 
and introduce a strong element of ambiguity.
There’s also an incomplete understanding of what the AFP 
is supposed to be doing. Interviewees for this project told us 
that some expatriates thought the AFP was coming to make 
the streets safer for their businesses. Locals expect the AFP 
to arrest criminals and take action on their complaints about 
the RPNGC. And some officials just aren’t sure of the aims. 
Expectations are high—perhaps too high when compared to 
the ECP, given the numbers, geography and mandate.
It’s worth considering why all this assistance hasn’t delivered 
a far greater return so far. Three reasons stand out: the 
fluctuating level of engagement, the scale of the task 
compared to the resources assigned, and the challenge of 
building capacity in PNG. These challenges—which also relate 
to education and the cultural factors discussed above—mean 
that very basic needs must be fulfilled at the same time as 
more sophisticated ones. Moreover, PNG’s legal institutions 
aren’t the exclusive form of legitimate authority—and they 
don’t extend everywhere.
to the RPNGC. This expanded mission was launched after 
an agreement between PNG Prime Minister O’Neill and then 
Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd (and subsequently 
supported by Tony Abbott), on the Joint understanding 
between Australia and Papua New Guinea on further bilateral 
cooperation on health, education and law and order as part 
of the Regional Resettlement Arrangement.
The expanded mission’s aim is to boost community policing 
operations in PNG. This includes a wide variety of supporting 
activities in the areas of training, prosecutions, station 
management, specialised crime squads and, recently, 
corporate management. The new program also includes 
money for infrastructure development and a program that 
will allow RPNGC officers to experience policing in Australia.
The mandate for the expanded mission recognises the 
limitations set by the PNG Constitution, so the officers are 
involved in ‘publicly visible’ activities—without executive 
powers. Substantial contingents are deployed to Port 
Moresby and Lae.
But this mission’s being conducted under trying conditions—
and it’s highly politically relevant. For Australia, it’s linked to 
the immigration detention centre on Manus Island, which has 
been an important part of the border security policies of both 
PNG–APP Advisor mentors an RPNGC colleague on approaches to handling front counter complaints at Gerehu Police Station, Port Moresby. Photo courtesy PNG–Australia Policing Partnership.
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re-establish a significant AFP presence in PNG. After that, the 
PNG-APP grew steadily to 17 police by mid-2013, and then 
rapidly to the expanded mission of 73 today.
As result of these factors, traditional capacity development 
is only likely to work in the very long term, and in ways 
that support positive, peaceful, democratic and locally 
appropriate cultural and socioeconomic change. The 
practical challenges in delivering this cooperation have real 
implications for the type of assistance that might be offered 
by Australia in the future.
In the policing field, the lack of resources that the PNG 
Government has provided to the RPNGC since independence  
is a major contributor to today’s situation (see Appendix D). 
While no-one can say how much an effective RPNGC would 
cost, spending on the force hasn’t kept pace with the overall 
increase in government spending in recent years (Figure 1). 
Spending per citizen on policing has also been relatively 
stagnant for a long time, except for during the Bougainville 
crisis (Table 1). That’s changed recently, but not enough to 
build the RPNGC (Figure 2). The fluctuating level of Australia’s 
support over the years hasn’t been optimal either. After 
the high of the ECP in early 2005, it took over three years to 
Figure 1: PNG Government spending compared to police spending, 2010 to 2014
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Table 1: Expenditure on police, per head of population, 1983 to 2013
Year Population Actual Police 
Budget  
(million kina)
CPI (1977 = 100) Police budget, 
millions  
(in 1977 kina)
Kina per person 
spent on police  
(in 1977 kina)
1983 3.179 13.651 154.3 8.8 2.8
1990a 3.582 51.071 220.7 23.1 6.4
2004 5.948 121.000 782 15.4 2.6
2013 7.321 350.957 1184.8 29.6 4.0 (2013: 47.8) 
a Reflects expenditure on the Bougainville crisis.
Sources: Population—RPNGC Administrative Review Committee 2004 (1983, 1993), World Bank (2004, 2013); CPI—Bank of PNG Quarterly Economic Bulletin, 
December 2013, Table 9.2; Actual police budget—Report of the RPNGC Administrative Review Committee (1983, 1993, 2004), PNG Law and Justice Sector, 
Annual Performance Report 2013, Table 12. Calculations by the authors.
Shared interests, enduring cooperation: the future of Australia – PNG police engagement 13
The current police element of Australia’s development 
assistance could help ameliorate the impact of PNG’s crime 
and order problems on Australia’s interests. It’s also a good 
way to address important dimensions of the RPNGC’s needs. 
It’s currently targeted at most of the right areas, even if it’s 
mainly in Port Moresby and Lae and publicly visible roles 
receive most of the resources. The program’s changing all the 
time as adjustments are made in key areas, such as support 
to critical ‘back of house’ functions and whole-of-government 
cooperation in RPNGC Headquarters. New initiatives, such as 
building construction and a secondment program that brings 
PNG officers to Australia, are now starting too. But there are 
other opportunities that can’t be pursued right now because 
of the mission’s mandate and size.
A review of the program was originally planned for mid-2015, 
but it would be worthwhile to bring it forward to late 2014, 
especially given the recent call for a review by PNG Police 
Minister Robert Atiyafa. He wants to focus more effort on 
training PNG police overseas and using expatriate officers 
in four provincial headquarters. A review would also be 
Implications for the future of Australian 
police assistance to PNG
The above analysis shows that PNG’s law and justice sector, 
and in particular the RPNGC, has been under incredible 
pressure for years. The pressure comes from internal 
and external sources, led by the increasingly concerning 
crime and order situation. In addition, the government 
and the public expect better policing, as can be easily 
seen in the priority given to law and order and improving 
policing in PNG’s National Security Policy and Police 
Modernisation program.9
The RPNGC faces significant internal challenges in meeting 
expectations. Given their depth, the ambitious growth 
plan for the force over the next 15 years, and the looming 
demographic challenges created by the approaching 
retirement of about 25% of the force, a comprehensive 
program of reform—and extensive support for that reform—
will be needed.
Figure 2: RPNGC growth—targets and trends
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We assume that Australia will support an 
ongoing commitment to PNG’s police
We also assume that the Australian Government will continue 
to assist the RPNGC if that assistance is welcome. What we 
don’t know is how much support the government is willing to 
give, or how much will be accepted.
The current Australian mission puts around 73 AFP officers 
in-country and provides some funding for infrastructure, 
training courses, secondments and other support for a cost 
of around $37 million.10 We use this figure as a benchmark to 
provide options for around half that amount, for nearly twice 
that amount, and for roughly the same cost. We assume that 
the current AFP International Network deployment, which 
involves two AFP officers, local staff and funds for training, 
will remain the same.
Our level of additional funding is based on reports that Prime 
Minister Abbott might commit more to PNG if it can be shown 
that the additional outlay would be worthwhile. We’ve used a 
figure of $25 million to represent the rough cost of deploying 
another 50 AFP officers, but express it in dollar terms to give 
some flexibility to our option development.
Objectives must meet mutual interests
It’s essential to identify the objectives of the cooperation 
before identifying options for a future engagement strategy. 
With the long-term political objective being to develop PNG 
as a sovereign, prosperous and successful country, creating 
an effective RPNGC that can promote the rule of law, prevent 
crime, use resources to their maximum effect and contribute 
to a positive human rights situation in PNG is a generational 
undertaking. There’s no quick fix. The current level of direct 
assistance to the RPNGC of around $37 million a year—or 
even more—will not achieve those objectives within 10 years, 
unless there’s dramatic change in the appetites of both 
governments and changes to the PNG Constitution and an 
adequate resolution on immunities to allow an executive 
policing powers model.
Assuming that current appetites and legislative conditions 
remain relatively constant, it’s necessary to set modest 
objectives for this cooperation. In the shorter term, out to 
2020, the objective should be to stabilise the RPNGC as an 
institution and build a base for the future. This base would 
initially be built in the RPNGC’s main centres. It would also 
useful because Prime Minister Abbott is known to be open to 
deploying more Australian police if needed.
But it’s hard to know whether the current allocation of 
Australian development assistance to the RPNGC is sufficient 
because we don’t know what the PNG Government wants to 
achieve through the current level of assistance and how much 
the Australian Government is willing to spend to protect and 
promote its interests. 
Assumptions about the future
Since some assumptions are needed, this section outlines 
these before we provide options for different funding levels 
and alternative focuses for police assistance.
We assume that the PNG Government wants an 
effective police force
Prime Minister O’Neill has said that he wants a better law 
and order situation and a stronger police force. After all, 
that’s why he invited Australia to send police to PNG last year. 
He’s also increased spending on the RPNGC and agreed to 
enhance the modernisation program. In his 2012 election 
policy, O’Neill said he wants to increase the number of 
police—dramatically—and apply a ‘zero tolerance’ approach 
to crime. He also understands the impact of other sectors 
upon law and order, especially education and training that 
will allow PNG citizens to become self-reliant. We assume a 
continuing validity for these policies over the coming years, 
and that future PNG Governments will adopt similar policies 
until they and their voters are satisfied with the RPNGC.
Some observers of politics and governance in PNG might say 
that our assumption is misplaced. They’ll point to powerful 
countervailing forces in PNG that benefit from a police force 
that can’t pursue sophisticated crime, especially fraud and 
corruption, or is likely to hold them to account for personal 
behaviour. But they’d probably agree that a ‘no AFP support 
at all’ position would be unlikely.
Indeed, the withdrawal of all Australian police again, as 
happened in 2005, is unlikely: a reasonable number (around 
17) were already there under an established program. But it’s 
certainly possible that PNG ministers might want to change 
the ‘publicly visible’ mission. So we won’t develop a ‘no AFP 
in PNG’ option, and will focus our options instead on a mix of 
missions and resourcing levels.
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it’s a permanent partner with the RPNGC and respectful 
of PNG’s sovereignty. A long-term statement, akin to the 
close and enduring Defence Cooperation Program, would 
help to promote this sense of permanency and reinforce 
existing statements of respect. It should be accompanied 
by a revised 30-year plan for cooperation that keeps 
the RPNGC in the lead while helping it to achieve the 
goals set for it in the PNG Government’s Vision 2050 
statement. It should also include some firm governance 
principles and an explicit link to development in PNG’s 
broader law and justice sector. Subject to agreement by 
both governments, and perhaps further into the future, 
there could be value in exploring potential for a similar 
legal mechanism to the Status of Forces Agreement 
that governs the rights and responsibilities of Australian 
military personnel working in PNG and PNGDF members 
working in Australia.
• Greater international focus. The current PNG–Australia 
police partnership program includes some international 
aspects, but it’s largely focused on Port Moresby and 
Lae, while DFAT and the New Zealand Government are 
working on Bougainville (see Appendix E). Still, Australia’s 
the main source of capacity-building support to the 
RPNGC: there’s little from any other country despite the 
significant growth in international investment in PNG over 
the past five years. Where that support is provided, it can 
be in unconstructive forms such as cheap weapons or 
unconditional aid. PNG also sees itself as a regional leader 
in practical terms, as demonstrated by its role as host 
for the 2015 Pacific Games and the 2018 APEC Leaders 
meeting. This desire to lead presents an opportunity 
to bring more international partners into the effort to 
help build capability in the RPNGC and to leverage its 
existing position.
• Solid information on crime and the police. The paucity 
of reliable statistics about crime and the RPNGC reduces 
the PNG Government’s ability to base its resource 
allocations on evidence. Good data will also provide a 
basis for understanding change and the impact of support 
to PNG, and better information about the effectiveness of 
different capability development programs.
• Full-spectrum capacity assistance based on full PNG 
involvement. It’s hard to identify an area of the RPNGC 
that won’t require support for decades to come, but it will 
focus on establishing systems that allow the RPNGC to grow 
at a fundable rate, reducing the number of complaints against 
the force, laying the basis for an effective discipline system, 
building effective corporate governance and improving the 
rate of committal to court for those arrested. Any quantitative 
ambitions for improvement in these areas should be modest.
Beyond that, to 2025, the mutual objective should be to 
build the effectiveness of the RPNGC across the nation. 
This objective should be based on improving the force’s 
performance and lifting its standards until, over a 30-year 
period, they’re similar to those of comparable police forces.
These are modest objectives. However, if they’re matched 
with heightened accountability, sustained support and 
progress that’s measured in sensible ways, stabilising the 
RPNGC and making it a stronger institution within 10 years is 
feasible. Building deep competence in highly technical areas, 
especially those concerning emerging crime, is likely to take 
more time.
Principles for AFP–RPNGC cooperation
While the PNG Government and the RPNGC remain 
responsible for achieving these objectives, international 
support will certainly help. We think that this support 
should be based on some principles that stress this shared 
responsibility and set the intention for future cooperation.
Our examination of the respective interests and capabilities 
of PNG and Australia, and our understanding of how 
capacity development might lead to results in time, can be 
distilled into five basic principles for police cooperation and 
engagement that governments should seek to agree on.
• Consistent, predictable long-term engagement 
and cooperation. Policing in PNG is the responsibility 
of the PNG community and government, and it’s up 
to the government to decide what help to ask for. But 
Australia is willing to provide real assistance if welcomed. 
At present, the AFP’s new contribution is based on a 
four-year program within a 30-year vision for cooperation. 
This is a good start. It’s flexible, and it sends a strong 
message about the persistence and depth of intention 
on both sides. While the shape of the engagement may 
change over time—for example, it may focus more on 
crime-fighting cooperation as the decades pass—the 
Australian Government should send the message that 
16 Special Report
Options for the future
Options for such initiatives and for allocating Australian 
assistance to the RPNGC can be based on different levels of 
Australian funding (the current level, half the current level, 
and current spending plus an extra $25 million). There is also 
variations in focus between ‘publicly visible policing’ (the 
current mandate) and a station/training/management focus 
(a deeper emphasis on supporting roles). Also included are 
some initiatives that should be implemented regardless of 
the option chosen.
Each option assumes that the AFP mission has discretionary 
funding to use on domestic and overseas training 
opportunities for the RPNGC, police station upgrades, some 
operational costs and a small amount for capital equipment 
acquisition. Such a budget will provide the AFP with some 
flexibility to overcome obstacles in the system. This budget 
will also support an extensive secondment program for the 
RPNGC in all options (around $250,000 p.a.). If funds are 
available, the capital works should also extend to housing for 
RPNGC members and their families.
No change is assumed in the current legal standing of the AFP 
contribution. We think that a mission with executive powers 
(akin to the 2004 ECP) is the best option, but we don’t think 
that the PNG Government has the appetite to propose the 
necessary legal changes to allow this type of mission now. 
Nor could we usefully speculate about whether constitutional 
change would be passed, so it’s not worth developing an 
option for an executive powers mission yet.
The options are summarised in Table 2 and explained below.
also be hard to do everything at once. A plan for long-term 
engagement is needed. Practically, this will involve 
targeting priority areas first, paying attention to training, 
equipment, accommodation and the individual wellbeing 
of officers. The sustainability of the work and building 
connections to related areas are also important. This 
means that the spectrum of capacity development needs 
to include whole-of-government cooperation, and, in 
cooperation with other agencies, support to prosecutions 
and oversight. Some assistance to the mobile squads (see 
Appendix F)—an area currently not directly covered in 
Australian cooperation—is also needed, but this should 
be training in nonviolent conflict resolution, community 
engagement, human rights and the use of minimum force 
in public order policing. Importantly, external support for 
RPNGC capability development needs to be supported 
from within by a greater commitment to discipline and 
accountability. Without that, external support can only go 
so far.
• Robust and transparent links to community and 
business. The PNG Government can’t provide sufficient 
resources to provide all the services required in the 
country, and the police force is but one priority among 
many. It’s also a fact that the business community 
provides resources to police every day in PNG. This 
creates major ethical dilemmas and promotes corruption 
in both the police and business. It also sees the nation’s 
very limited police resources channelled to support 
private concerns at a fraction of their true cost. A 
transparent, nondiscriminatory way for business to 
support the police should be created in PNG. It should 
be based on constructive engagement, arm’s-length 
transactions and monitoring by non-RPNGC agencies 
or individuals.
A broad set of principles like this would be a useful basis for 
developing a program of cooperation and other initiatives 
that can be taken forward in the next 5–10 years.
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Table 2: Options for a future AFP contribution to the RPNGC
Modernisation goals for RPNGC
Option
Maintain law order in 
partnership with the 
community
Improved 
investigation, 
detection and 
prosecution of 
offenses
A highly professional 
and accountable 
organisation
A well-equipped and 
professional police 
service
Impact
Option 1: 
 Baseline. ($37 million 
p.a. with the current 
‘publicly visible’  
mandate)
Mentoring to five 
stations in Lae and Pt 
Moresby
Some support in the 
areas of fraud and 
prosecutions
Some support for 
finance, planning, 
logistics, reform 
interagency liaison, 
internal affairs
Advice to Bomana 
Police College
With around 73 
officers, this option 
meets government 
expectations, but 
we’re unsure whether 
being ‘publicly visible’ 
is value for money
Option 2: 
Organisation  building 
($37 million p.a. and 
a ‘deeper support’ 
focus)
Support for station 
management in three 
locations
More support in 
the areas of fraud, 
prosecutions, family 
violence, intelligence   
and organised crime
Significant support 
for finance, planning, 
logistics, reform, 
statistics, interagency 
liaison, internal affairs
Advice and in-line 
trainers to Bomana 
College, 2 x training 
teams, support to 
welfare
This option moves 
resources from 
publicly visible 
activities to deepen 
the AFP’s support role 
for the RPNGC
Option 3:  
Reduced involvement 
($19 million p.a. with 
a reduced mandate) 
Support for station 
management in two 
locations
Support in the areas 
of fraud, prosecutions 
and organised crime
Limited support for 
planning, logistics,  
statistics and internal 
affairs
Advice to Bomana 
College, support to 
welfare
With about 37 AFP 
officers, this option 
is unlikely to help the 
RPNGC reach its goals 
in the 5-10 year period 
Option 4:  
Baseline Plus 
($62 million p.a. with 
the current ‘publicly 
visible’ mandate and 
about 50 extra staff)
Mentoring to around 
14 stations in Lae, Pt 
Moresby and Mt Hagen
Some support in 
the areas of fraud, 
prosecutions, and 
organised crime
Some support for 
finance, planning, 
logistics, interagency 
liaison, internal affairs
Advice and in-line 
trainers to Bomana 
College
This option weights 
resources towards 
direct support to 
front-line policing and 
opens a third location. 
There’s more for 
Bomana, and a little 
more for the ‘back 
room’, but it still lacks 
executive policing 
powers.
Option 5:  
Organisation  building 
plus ($62 million 
p.a. and a ‘deeper 
support’ focus, with 
funds for about 50  
extra staff)
Mentoring to around 
six stations 
Significant support 
in the areas of fraud, 
prosecutions, family 
violence, intelligence 
and organised crime
Significant support 
for finance, planning, 
logistics, reform, 
statistics, interagency 
liaison, internal affairs
Advice and in-line 
trainers to Bomana 
College, 7 x training 
teams, support to 
welfare
This option greatly 
increases support for 
training, and adds 
more resources for 
specialist squads, 
welfare and the back 
room.
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secondments, professional development. Attention’s given 
to ‘backroom’ governance functions; according to recent 
advice, this is increasing capacity in areas such as finance and 
event planning.
The disadvantage of Option 1 lies in the possible 
unwillingness of the PNG Government to continue 
with the model. Already, there are rumblings about 
cost-effectiveness and a minister has said a review’s needed. 
The key disadvantages in the mission design are its limited 
geographical focus, the limitation to 12 hours a day of 
operations, the limited ability to influence the ‘back of house’ 
and specialised squads, and the lack of direct engagement 
in public order policing. The ‘publicly visible’ model, which 
is being performed without executive policing powers, also 
raises expectations that can’t be met.
Option 2: Organisation building 
($37 million p.a. and a ‘deeper support’ focus)
Option 2 assumes the current level of funding, and so retains 
levels of resourcing for facilities, training and secondments 
similar to those in Option 1. This option builds on elements of 
Option 1, which already devotes some resources to structure, 
especially for training, specialised squads and governance.
The key difference between this option and Option 1 is 
the transfer of resources from ‘publicly visible’ policing to 
enable a deeper emphasis on supporting roles. This would 
include more for training at Bomana College (including 
increasing its student and staff capacity), the formation 
of a small regional training team, and greater support for 
the RPNGC’s specialised squads and backroom functions. 
Resources would be assigned to allow a smaller number 
of stations to have 24-hour advisory coverage, focusing on 
station management, follow-on training, resource usage 
and assisting community engagement. Resources for 
data collection (either staffed or outsourced) and welfare 
expertise would be included.
The key advantages of this option are its sharper focus on 
training the RPNGC and its potential for a wider geographical 
spread through the regional training team. This team 
would follow up the training at Bomana by helping RPNGC 
supervisors to complete competency-based training for 
the probationary constables. The team could also provide 
training in human rights, nonviolent conflict resolution and 
the minimum use of force for the mobile squads.
Option 1: Baseline ($37 million p.a. with the 
current ‘publicly visible’ mandate)
The current AFP operation includes a ‘publicly visible’ 
policing mandate—which includes police on the beat and 
station management advisers—and costs around $37 million. 
This amount provides for 73 sworn and unsworn officers in 
PNG, money for training courses and secondments, and some 
funds for minor building works. Importantly, the current 
operation—and so this option—also provides some resources 
to support training, governance and specialised squads.
This mission design aims to build RPNGC capacity to:
• lead and manage the force’s police stations
• be visible in the community, including through foot 
patrols
• promote standards in prosecutions, detainee 
management, community engagement and intelligence
• support investigations in the areas of family and sexual 
violence, financial intelligence, internal affairs, fraud and 
anticorruption
• help units such as traffic, airport security and forensics
• enhance training at Bomana Police College
• implement better logistics, project management and the 
modernisation program in RPNGC Headquarters.
Over 60% of the mission’s people are devoted to the first 
two aims, which fulfils the agreed direction to involve AFP 
officers in publicly visible activities. Resources are also 
available to develop multipurpose buildings at Boroko and 
the Officers Mess at Bomana in Year 1. The funding available 
will also support management-level training courses, provide 
a five-person team at Bomana College, and fund a small 
secondment program that will allow up to 40 RPNGC junior 
officers to come to Australia each year.
The key advantage of this option is that it meets the existing 
mandate, as agreed by both prime ministers. It provides a 
high level of AFP presence in police stations in Port Moresby 
and Lae, and allows that presence to be sustained from 
8 am to 8 pm. There’s direct support for the priority areas of 
internal affairs, prosecutions, and fraud and anticorruption. 
The current mission also puts significant resources into 
initial and workplace training and, through the post-training 
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training while expanding into some more ‘back-end’ areas, 
and it would be easy to shift resources from station police to 
training if desired.
But this option contains a real risk that the RPNGC would not 
be in a position to begin an upward trajectory in five years. It 
could only be expected to attenuate, rather than overcome, 
the institutional challenges facing the RPNGC. And it’s 
unlikely to meet Australia’s interests either.
Option 4: Baseline plus ($62 million p.a. with 
the current ‘publicly visible’ mandate and 
about 50 extra staff)
Option 4 uses an additional $25 million to deploy an 
additional 50 AFP officers, based on the current ‘publicly 
visible’ mandate. The increase would establish a new team 
to another major area (such as Mt Hagen) and round out the 
existing police team structures in Port Moresby and Lae. 
Additional support for training at Bomana College and the 
specialised squads could be provided. Further adjustment 
of the current model, allowing more staff to be deployed to 
priority areas, would also be a feature of this option.
If research and an objective review show that the current 
mission is achieving its objectives but that more is needed, 
then this option is worth considering. It would certainly 
provide a sharper focus on RPNGC development in three 
major centres and in the force’s headquarters. Some 
reallocation of resources from Port Moresby and Lae might 
also be possible in time, as RPNGC capacity in those cities 
improves. This could allow for a team for a smaller fourth 
town or provide resources for a regional training squad (see 
Option 2). The expanded mission should be funded through 
an increase in resources to the AFP (rather than come at the 
expense of other aid projects).
The disadvantage of this option is the limited improvement in 
mentoring coverage that would be achieved for a significant 
increase in resources. The publicly visible model is people 
intensive, so rounding out the existing teams in Port Moresby 
and Lae and adding another (while clearly warranted) might 
not be considered good value for money. Again, the option 
might not be tenable if PNG Government support for a 
publicly visible mission wanes.
Its disadvantage is the lack of police in publicly visible roles, 
which means that a change in political direction would be 
needed to make the option viable. Some think that there 
might be a negative public response to the change, too. 
There’s also an increased risk to personnel from night-time 
presence in the police stations, and fewer stations are 
covered in this model. It’s also a concern that an early change 
might not allow the full impact of the current model to be 
evaluated. This would reduce both government’s ability to 
judge whether the ‘publicly visible’ model worked or not. 
That could have implications for future assistance models.
This option also assumes that both governments would want 
Australian training—in limited areas—for the mobile squads, 
although rejecting this element doesn’t seriously damage 
the option. The major disadvantage of this option would be 
that it spreads the AFP thinner on the ground. Fewer Port 
Moresby stations would receive dedicated support, and 
the regional teams (two squads) would need to be a fly-in 
fly-out operation across 19 other provinces (and perhaps 
Bougainville). This would limit it to about 3–5 weeks of visits 
to each province each year.
Option 3: Reduced involvement 
($19 million p.a. with a reduced mandate)
Given the seemingly modest objectives of this engagement, 
it’s plausible that reduced funding could still help the RPNGC 
and maintain Australia as its key support provider. A program 
costing around $19 million per year and involving perhaps 
somewhat more than 37 officers the support provided under 
the PNG–APP in 2012–13, before the additional 50 AFP officers 
were added.
The reduced funding would cut most of the publicly visible 
tasks of the current operation, but retain mentoring functions 
in some police stations and specialised squads. Support 
to Bomana College would remain as is, but there would be 
additional resources for statistics and welfare services.
It’s hard to find an advantage in this option except that it’s 
cheaper than the current program and larger than the earlier 
Phase III program of the PNG-APP. However, it might suit 
political needs if PNG support for ‘publicly visible’ Australian 
policing assistance wanes. It keeps the same focus on 
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Further initiatives
All five options could be supported by one or more further 
initiatives:
• An enhanced partnership agreement. We’ve assumed 
that the AFP won’t receive executive policing powers 
in PNG. If that situation continues (and it’s the PNG 
Government’s right not to change its position), options 
that include ‘publicly visible’ police roles, or even in-line 
roles in training, are less attractive. However, a stronger 
partnership agreement that provides suitable protections 
might make it less risky for AFP officers take some 
important in-line roles in training and governance. Making 
the partnership a perpetual one, based on a 30-year plan 
and regular reviews, would help to promote a sense of 
permanency in the relationship.
• Improving the gender balance. Increasing the number 
of female police in the RPNGC would make the force more 
representative of its community. Local, Australian and 
international support in this area should be encouraged 
and funded.
• Budget decentralisation. Finding a better way to provide 
the police stations with funds must be a high priority for 
the RPNGC. The current system isn’t working, as shown 
by last year’s underspend and complaints about the 
amount and timing of money received at the station level. 
However, any decentralisation must not simply provide 
opportunities for more graft at lower levels.
• Education and selection. Finding ways to boost the 
number of quality candidates for the RPNGC will be 
critical to allowing the force to grow in a way that will 
address its challenges. We understand that a recent 
review has recommended outsourcing recruitment 
(and that may help), but getting enough raw prospects 
who’ll apply for the RPNGC is also a challenge. A form of 
police educational scholarship, or perhaps a police cadet 
system, should be considered. This would encourage 
young people who need support through high school 
to consider the RPNGC as a career, or even provide 
education to suitable recruits through a school they 
could attend before formally entering the constabulary. 
We understand that there’s a move in a similar direction 
in Bougainville, so that might serve as a pilot for a 
broader program.
Option 5: Organisation building plus 
($62 million p.a. and a ‘deeper support’ focus, 
with funds for about 50 extra staff)
Option 5 also includes increased resources, but adopts the 
same broad focus as Option 2. The extra resources would 
increase the number of station teams (to six) and allow the 
regional training team (of seven squads) to visit each province 
for about 8–10 weeks per year. There would also be sufficient 
resources for increased support for prosecutions and the 
specialised quads, including more officers for intelligence 
and family and sexual violence investigations. There could 
also be more support from unsworn officers and contractors 
for the back-end roles of whole-of-government planning, 
modernisation (morphing into oversight, should the RPNGC 
appoint an inspector-general, as suggested in 2004), statistics 
and personnel services.
Once again, this option is predicated on an agreement to 
reduce the focus on publicly visible roles while retaining 
support at the station level. Its advantages are in the depth of 
training and mentoring support that could be provided across 
the RPNGC. The depth of the training team, for example, 
could allow long initial visits and short follow-ups, which 
would reinforce training and help to cement changes. More 
AFP horsepower for the specialised squads would also boost 
their ability to tackle major crime while they send people for 
training and secondments. This would substantially increase 
the chances that the longer term objective of building the 
RPNGC could begin within 10 years.
Perhaps the main disadvantage of this option is that it 
spreads resources thinly. This could be ameliorated by 
increasing the visit cycle to provinces for the training teams 
from 12 to 18 months, decreasing the number of stations 
with dedicated mentoring support or increasing the AFP 
numbers slightly.
Two prerequisites are needed for this option to work. The first 
is unambiguous political support for the mission, which is 
currently missing. Second, the RPNGC’s senior leaders would 
need to be willing to work even more closely with the AFP 
to implement the major aspects of this option. That might 
require the movement of some unsupportive or unsuitable 
officers to areas that more suit their expertise, and their 
replacement with RPNGC officers who will actively support 
the Police Commissioner’s modernisation plans.
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• Links with business and the community. Establishing 
robust and transparent relations with business should be 
a priority. One way to do this is to follow the model being 
used in Lae. Wherever possible, local support should 
be used to implement initiatives, and the AFP is well 
positioned to give all players confidence that projects 
they support will be completed. Extending this model to 
include major companies would also be worthwhile.
• Boosting RPNGC numbers. The RPNGC will miss its 
2015 target strength by a long way. It’s also very unlikely 
to grow to its desired size by 2050 based on the current 
separation rate and training throughput. Reform of the 
training system and an expansion of Bomana College 
might help if the recruits can be found, but there’s a 
real risk that an accelerated separation rate—due to the 
number of pending RPNGC retirements—will leave a 
gap in the force. Using Australian Police in a supervisory 
role—that is, with limited powers—might address that 
gap if constitutional change occurs.
But other ways to boost RPNGC numbers might also be 
worth considering. For example, Police Minister Atiyafa 
and the PNG Chamber of Commerce have suggested 
employing contract police in the RPNGC. This has merits, 
particularly because it would quickly boost the force’s 
skills. It would also be possible to give the contracted 
officers executive policing powers, which the AFP can’t 
get right now. But there’s a disadvantage in that the 
scheme would create a ‘two-tier’ RPNGC. It might also be 
difficult to get quality candidates, especially if service in 
PNG is not highly valued by home police forces. Selecting 
the right officers—not mercenaries or those at the sunset 
of their careers—will be critical if this is to work.
• Communicate with PNG leaders and citizens. 
In conducting the research for this paper, we were 
surprised by how many otherwise well-informed Papua 
New Guineans, including senior officials, had only 
a cursory grasp of the police partnership. That was 
especially pronounced among those who reported that 
their expectations (mainly of a revived ECP) had been 
disappointed. While the Australian High Commission and 
the AFP already conduct briefings, more information that 
highlights the partnership would be useful in shaping 
those expectations.
• Boost international support. There are three ways to 
‘internationalise’ the task of boosting RPNGC capability:
First, PNG and Australia should approach other donors 
to support capacity development in the RPNGC. 
The numbers of people needed are not large, but they 
should include trainers, including on human rights and 
gender awareness, and specialists to assist with work on 
forensics, fraud and money laundering, and Asian and 
African organised crime. ‘Recruiting’ should be focused 
in countries and regions investing in PNG with a proven 
capacity for international support and solid practices. 
It’s unlikely that international support could displace the 
AFP’s leadership role in capacity development assistance, 
but it would provide more ‘flags on the ground’ and 
perhaps reduce the misplaced criticism that the AFP’s 
assistance is an Australian neo-colonial front.
Second, use Bomana College as a regional centre in 
investigation training. Once the college is established 
as a fully accredited training institution (which will take 
time), its remit should be expanded to include training 
in high-end police skills. Part of the college could be 
restructured as a cooperative arrangement between 
the PNG Government and major donors based on a 
model such as the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement. 
It should have an arm’s-length governance system led 
by Australia to increase donor confidence and ensure 
that PNG’s priorities are met. An early focus could be on 
investigations training. This would allow PNG to promote 
itself as a regional leader and establish common skills 
standards across the Pacific’s many police forces. Beyond 
that, the college would also provide opportunities to train 
other government agencies in law enforcement functions. 
And if well-coordinated with other initiatives, Bomana 
would complement other regional centres focused on 
other aspects of policing.
Third, increase RPNGC training and secondments 
in Australia (and perhaps New Zealand). The current 
placement scheme being established by the AFP is a very 
good start. Its two-month placements are better than 
those of previous schemes and will give secondees some 
depth of experience. It should be monitored for value, and 
extended if that’s worthwhile.
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The limitations on the AFP’s ability to sustain a larger 
operation in PNG from a lower resourcing base increase 
the importance of gaining outside support. While some 
personnel would come from Australian state police 
forces, more international support should be obtained for 
this mission.
A larger and more geographically widespread mission would 
also increase the risk for non-PNG personnel. Accepting the 
deeper remit proposed in some of the options set out here 
will mean addressing those risks and accepting that some 
can’t be completely negated.
This report does not examine the support to PNG from the 
AFP’s International Network in depth, but interviewees 
explained the importance of that support. While senior AFP 
leaders think that the level of support is currently about 
right, it’s possible that additional resources will be needed 
for countering organised crime, corruption and money 
laundering. Those crimes have the highest likely impact on 
Australian interests.
Regardless of the scale of future Australian involvement with 
the RPNGC and the rest of the law and justice sector in PNG, 
we think that the direction of all Australian programs in PNG 
needs to be under the control of the High Commissioner. We 
understand that that’s not currently the case, which seems to 
go against best practice in development assistance.
The question of when Australian support should be scaled 
back won’t need answering for some time yet. Building 
the RPNGC will take a generation, perhaps longer. So there 
should be regular reviews of the program—at least every two 
or three years—to ensure that successes are built upon and 
priorities can be reset as needed.
A joint effort, and an important one
Violence, serious and organised crime, and challenges to 
public order in PNG are unlikely to decrease over the next 
decade. Collectively, these crime types will pose challenges 
for the country’s sovereignty, prosperity and stability. 
Allowing crime to derail PNG’s development or state 
institutions isn’t in anybody’s interest, including Australia’s.
Sustaining Australia’s engagement with 
the RPNGC
Our examination of Australia’s interests concludes that 
providing support to the RPNGC, as a way of promoting PNG’s 
prosperity and stability, is important and worth the money. 
We’ve assumed that Australia will continue to provide this 
support, and perhaps increase it.
The question is, to what value? The 2004–05 ECP planned to 
deploy 230 officers at a cost of around $160 million p.a. (in 
2004 dollars): that’s well over twice the cost of our expanded 
contribution options. And our least-cost option—halving 
spending on AFP support to $19 million—carries a real risk 
that the mission won’t achieve mutual objectives in a 5–10 
year timeframe.
The value of the Australian contribution could be clarified 
by a review of the current mission before the end of its first 
year, comparing data from pre-mission surveys in December 
2013 and collecting evidence from a broad spectrum of 
participants, experts and PNG society.
It could also be clarified by a frank and collegial discussion 
between Australian and PNG authorities to explore 
alternatives, if that’s what’s desired. However, that 
discussion should conclude with a clear statement that PNG 
welcomes additional AFP support and is willing to remove 
any ambiguity about it. A failure to show that confidence 
will surely reduce Australia’s will to devote resources to this 
mission, and a reduction in those resources would probably 
jeopardise prosperity and security in PNG in a direct way. 
While all involved respect PNG’s sovereignty and approach 
the future with goodwill, prime ministerial leadership—like 
that seen in the decision to invite a larger AFP contingent in 
2013—needs to be constantly reinforced.
And the AFP isn’t an inexhaustible resource. It can face real 
challenges in mounting concurrent missions of national 
importance, as the recent response to the MH17 atrocity 
in Ukraine shows. There’s also a real need to prepare AFP 
people for working in PNG, especially in language skills, which 
are essential outside the main cities, and as professional 
advisers. These factors place the Australian Government’s 
intention to reduce funding to the AFP in 2015–16 in 
harsh relief.
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It would be best to allocate additional funds to this project, 
rather than to simply reallocate from within the existing PNG 
aid budget because successful law enforcement will need 
a healthy and well-educated public who can rely on good 
infrastructure. Australian aid is important to all of these areas 
and to creating a prosperous, sovereign and successful PNG.
Of course, the resource cake can be cut in many ways, and 
mixing and matching the options is feasible. However, more 
money isn’t enough to make this engagement work. Unless 
the RPNGC–AFP relationship has clear support from the two 
governments, the benefit of any effort is likely to be reduced. 
If the two governments agree to a long-term partnership, 
remove existing ambiguities and state their support for 
the RPNGC, international assistance could achieve the 
modest but essential objectives described here over the 
next 10 years. That would be a good outcome for all, and in 
everybody’s enduring interests.
It’s ultimately the responsibility of the PNG Government 
and its community to provide the climate and resources to 
promote law and order. The RPNGC—as part of the broader 
law and justice sector—will be the key institution in this 
national effort, but it will need significant support to do 
so. This means the international community, particularly 
Australia, should play a role in developing the RPNGC 
because this institution will be unable to become fully 
effective without such support. The extent of its needs, the 
prevailing conditions and the resource base all work against a 
wholly home-grown solution to the RPNGC’s challenges.
The importance of a fully effective RPNGC cannot be 
overstated, but achieving that is a generational project. This 
means a long-term view of cooperation and engagement 
between Australia and PNG will be essential. This partnership 
could be pursued in a number of ways, including by following 
the format of the current AFP mission and possibly extending 
its size. However, that might not be the best way ahead: 
the AFP lacks the powers and immunities to make ‘publicly 
visible’ policing truly effective, and even a larger mission 
that followed the current pattern would still have a narrow 
geographical scope.
From our perspective, Option 5, which requires additional 
funding and places a stronger emphasis on using the AFP 
to develop supporting structures in the RPNGC is the 
recommended option, subject to the full agreement of the 
PNG Government. This option retains many aspects of the 
current mission, but allocates more resources for training at 
Bomana College and in the provinces, some attention to the 
mobile squads, enhanced support for RPNGC governance, 
and more training for RPNGC officers in Australia, in other 
countries and in the police stations of PNG.
This focus will be possible only if Australian and PNG 
leaders express a desire to reduce the proportion of 
resources devoted to the ‘publicly visible’ component of the 
current mission.
Increasing resources for this cooperation to around 
$62 million p.a. would bolster a flagging RPNGC and ensure 
that a full-spectrum approach can be adopted and sustained 
over time. It would also promote professional police practice 
across the whole force. The current level of resourcing is 
unlikely achieve that.
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• PNG–Australia Policing Partnership (PNG-APP). Most 
of Australia’s support to law and justice in PNG has 
been provided to the RPNGC through many programs, 
the most recent of which has been the PNG-APP 
(from 2008 to today). By mid-2013, this program had 
grown to 23 officers working in governance, long-term 
development and reform. It included projects on training, 
logistics, professional standards, governance and 
accountability, and fraud and anticorruption. A further 50 
officers were added as ‘Phase IV’ after the joint agreement 
was signed in 2013. The PNG-APP is not controlled by the 
High Commissioner in Port Moresby, but reports directly 
to the AFP in Canberra.
• Combating Corruption Project (CCP). This project is 
delivered by the Attorney-General’s Department and 
Austrac. It aims to enhance PNG’s ability to prevent and 
combat corruption by hardening the financial system 
against money laundering, corrupt activity and terrorist 
financing. It builds PNG capacity to analyse, investigate 
and prosecute money laundering and recover the 
proceeds of crime. The project helps PNG comply with 
Financial Action Task Force recommendations and meet 
key parts of its task force action plan through legal policy 
development assistance and peer-to-peer institutional 
linkages and mentoring, delivered through a series of 
short-term visits and distance assistance.
The AFP also maintains a senior liaison officer in Port Moresby 
and a dedicated transnational crime liaison officer to help 
PNG participate in the Pacific Transnational Crime Network. 
These programs, with the exception of PALJP, are managed 
from Canberra. While the High Commissioner in Port 
Moresby plays a coordinating role, Australia’s most senior 
representative in PNG has no direct authority for managing 
this work. This situation is very different to that experienced 
by American ambassadors, who are responsible for all 
government activities in their country, regardless of which 
department provides the resources.
Appendix A: Australian support to PNG’s 
law and justice sector
Australia contributes around $75 million a year to PNG’s law 
and justice sector through four main programs:
• PNG–Australia Law and Justice Program (PALJP). 
Since 2003, Australia has provided support through this 
program to meet five strategic goals for the law and 
justice sector: improved policing and safety; improved 
access to justice; improved reconciliation and deterrence; 
improved accountability; and improved service delivery. 
Substantial infrastructure support, organisational 
and policy development, skills training, and policies 
to increase women’s participation in the sector have 
enabled the expansion of services across the country. This 
is a sustained commitment that was refocused in 2014 to 
put more emphasis on increasing justice delivered locally 
in six provinces and Bougainville, including by village 
courts, a renewed focus on family and sexual violence, 
promoting multi-agency responses to improve service 
delivery, and anticorruption efforts. The program is 
mainly delivered by contracted advisers. It’s being revised 
so that a new program can begin in 2016.
• Strongim Gavam Program (SGP). This program 
is managed as a partnership between Australian 
agencies and their PNG counterparts. There are around 
35 Australian Government deployees, with 11 from the 
Attorney-General’s Department assigned to positions 
in the law and justice sector. They focus on legal 
agencies, including the Department of Justice and 
Attorney-General and the Office of the Public Prosecutor. 
In addition to capacity-building tasks and mentoring local 
staff, the treaty covering the deployments allows qualified 
Australians to provide legal advice and appear in court.
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Australian contributions to PNG’s Law and Justice Sector
PNG Non-government and community partners (including community crime prevention, the private security industry)
PNG
-APP
Corrections
Justice and Courts
Formal law enforcement
Transport security 
Customs 
Tax 
Finance 
Treasury
Policy
Oversight
SGP
PALJP
Informal law
enforcement
and security
CCP
PALJP = PNG–Australia Law and Justice Program; PNG-APP = PNG–Australia Policing Partnership; SGP = Strongim Gavam Program  
CCP = Combating Corruption Program. 
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Appendix B: Growing the Royal Papua 
New Guinea Constabulary
The RPNGC’s lineage can be traced to the British and 
German colonial police forces, the first of which was formed 
in 1885. Constables served with distinction in World War II 
and played a vital role in the colonial administration. This 
included their support to the ‘Kiap’ patrol officers who 
extended government control into the hinterland. Despite 
this heritage, the RPNGC is still a relatively recent innovation. 
Its development as a professional police force, separate 
from the colonial administrative system, only really began in 
the 1960s.
At independence in 1975, when the population of the new 
nation was around 2 million, the RPNGC was around 4,100 
strong. In 2013, it had grown by 25% to 5,724 sworn and 374 
unsworn members, while the population had trebled to more 
than 7.3 million. The slight growth in police numbers, which 
was not helped by a decade-long recruiting freeze that ended 
in 2013, means that PNG has a very low police-to-population 
ratio of 78:100,000 (Table 3). By comparison, the ratio 
in Vanuatu is 277:100,000; in Australia, it’s around 
268:100,000).11 The number of female officers in the force is 
growing, and is now around 10%.
The PNG Government wants to grow the RPNGC to more 
than 13,000 by 2020 and to 24,000 by 2030. Based on current 
personnel separations (retirements, resignations etc.) of 
about 4% p.a., and a training throughput of about 540 new 
police p.a., those targets are unlikely to be reached.12
The separation rate is set to grow over the next five years 
as a large number of RPNGC officers reach retirement age. 
Already, 15% of the force is past mandatory retirement age, 
and another 29% will reach that marker by 2018. Nearly 
one-third of current supervisors should have retired by now, 
and 64% should retire within the next four years, suggesting 
that the RPNCG will have a significant experience gap in its 
ranks within the next few years.
Of those currently serving, only a small proportion are 
considered ‘well trained’.13 For example, nearly 1,000 haven’t 
completed the compulsory on-the-job training that’s meant 
to qualify them as full constables.
The policing body in PNG also includes reserve and 
community auxiliary police. The numbers of reserve police 
have tended to grow and then be wound back over the past 
decade and aren’t included in those counted here. Reservists 
usually provide police support directly to a private company 
that sponsors them, but they can supplement regular police 
units during peak periods and on weekends.
The RPNGC has 199 police stations, but low levels of staffing 
and poor attendance mean that the stations aren’t as 
effective as they might be. According to sources in Boroko 
and Lae, stations might be staffed to 100 on the books, but 
only 30–50% of personnel show regularly for work.
The number of arrests that result in committals and 
convictions is another measure of the challenges facing the 
RPNGC (Table 4). Currently, the ratio of case registrations to 
court committals is 20%; ideally, it should be 100%. The small 
prison population of around 2,800 suggests that the number 
sent to prison each year is also very small.
Table 3: Police to population in PNG, 1975 to 2013
Year RPNGC uniformed (est.) Population–m (est.) Police: Citizen Police per 100000 citizens
1975 4100 2.0 1:476 205:100000
1983 4460 3.2 1: 712 139:100000
1996 5000 4.0 1: 800 125:100000
2004 5250 5.9 1:1121 89:100000
2013 5724 7.3 1:1275 78:100000
Sources: Dinnen, Criminal justice reform in Papua New Guinea (1998) (population and police 1975, 1996), Report of the RPNGC Administrative Review 
Committee (2004) (population and police 1983, 2004); Law and Justice Sector Annual Performance Report 2013 (police 2013); World Bank (Population 2013)
Table 4: Reports, arrests and committals in 2013
Reports Arrests Cases registered Committed to national court Prison populations (convicted)
2,847 1,301 5,584 702 2,837
Source: Law and Justice Sector Annual Performance Report  2013, p. 58 (Table 2) and p. 65 (Table 11).
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Appendix C: Australian/AFP–RPNGC activity since 1975 
Year Australian/AFP-RPNGC activity
1975-88 • Australian assistance to RPNGC occurs via direct budget assistance to the PNG Government. First 
program scoping began in 1985.
• Support included training, consultancies, missions and police postings. Expatriate Australian officers 
employed in RPNGC (one remains serving today). 
1988-2002 • Transition from direct budget support to project and jointly programed aid.
• Projects include equipment and housing assistance.
1989-2005 • RPNGC Development Project Phases I-III: A$153m over period (dollar value at the time). Included 
placements of PNG police in Australia and, at its peak, around 40 Australian advisers in PNG.
2001— • Cross-border joint patrols and combined intelligence group for activity in Torres Strait – including 
Queensland Police and Customs. A number of narcotics importations detected. Cooperation on 
people smuggling.
2003-05 • The Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) was agreed 11 December 2003. The initial plan was 
to deploy up to 210 AFP officers and around 64 officials to build skills in RPNGC and broader PNG 
administration. The first deployment of officers began in February 2005.
• The police element of the ECP was withdrawn in May 2005 after the ‘Wenge’ decision by the PNG 
High Court. 
2006-08 • Transnational Crime Unit becomes operational in PNG with AFP support.
• Ongoing police-to-police cooperation on areas such as child sex offences, money-laundering, 
counter-terrorism, and preparation for deployments. 
• Pacific Police Development Program sees bi-lateral cooperation with training including strategic 
intelligence, peacekeeping and police management.
2008-09 • 11 AFP officers and some short-term advisers are deployed in September 2008 to scope the new 
PNG-Australia Policing Partnership (PNG-APP) (called ‘Phase I’).
2009-11 • PNG-APP delivers its strategic framework. 
• Other cooperation on areas such as drug smuggling, pre-deployment training, and infrastructure 
development. The main program focus was the ‘Centre of Excellence’ at Bomana and organisational 
governance and reform.
2012-13 • PNG-APP Phase II and III had 11 sworn and 5 unsworn AFP members in PNG. Phase III was set to grow to 
23 officers when the new mission was announced. Projects focused on training, logistics, professional 
standards, governance and accountability management frameworks, and fraud and anti-corruption.
2013-14 • Phase III of the PNG-APP is is supplemented by 50 additional AFP officers (bringing the number to 73) 
to work with a ‘publicly visible’ mandate in Port Moresby and Lae, together with support to Bomana 
College, RPNGC governance and specialised crime squads. 
• Other AFP-RPNGC activities include continued police-police cooperation, joint patrols and cooperation 
in the Torres Strait.
Sources: AFP annual reports; AusAID, The contribution of Australian aid to Papua New Guinea’s development 1975–2000; Sinclair Dinnen, The changing 
character of Australian assistance to the PNG law and justice sector, Table 13.1; EJ Michal, Australian aid to Papua New Guinea police—goals and limits, 1991
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Appendix D: Funding the RPNGC
Spending on the RPNGC is growing slowly, but it’s not 
growing in proportion with overall government expenditure 
and is decreasing as a proportion of total spending and 
spending on law and justice (Table 5). These are indicators 
of a real problem. Assistance from the AFP currently adds 
about 20% to the resources provided to the RPNGC by 
its government.
It’s worth tracking the change in expenditure per head on the 
RPNGC over time. This shows that the spending on the force 
(using the ‘per head of population’ measure) has increased. 
What it doesn’t tell us is how much is really needed.
Table 5: RPNGC budget, 2012 to 2014
2012 (actual) 2013 (actual) 2014 (approp.)
Law & justice sector K711.7 million K686.5 million K820.5 million
Law and justice as % of national budget 8.1% 5.5% 5.97%
RPNGC allocation from PNG Government K321.4 million K351.0 million K364.8 million
RPNGC as % of law and justice budget 45% 51% 44%
Sources: PNG Law and Justice Sector Annual Performance Report 2013, Table 12; PNG Department of Treasury.  
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foster a community-policing approach to order and justice. 
The community auxiliary police are well placed to make a 
strong contribution to lasting community safety by working 
with the grain of local beliefs and practices, according to 
academics Sinclair Dinnen and Gordon Peake.
Because political and social tensions may rise as the 
referendum approaches, greater efforts to harness and 
integrate the promise offered by the two bodies are needed: 
neither will be sufficient. It will take time for the more formal 
(and relatively costly) BPS to grow closer to the communities 
it serves. But the community auxiliary police display the 
procedural limitations and finite potential to be scaled up 
and formalised that are common to any organisation that 
works deep within micro-level societies and in line with their 
unique views, rules and processes.
Australia has provided $32 million in support of law and 
Justice in Bougainville since 2004, and the AFP is currently 
exploring options to re-engage directly with the BPS. The 
New Zealand Police plans to double its contribution of six 
officers and will increasingly support the BPS as well as the 
community auxiliary police.
DFAT, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
and the PNG and Bougainville governments have also 
recognised the need, identified in the 2013 Joint Review 
of Autonomy Arrangements, to develop Bougainville’s 
wider justice sector. Ideally, this will include support in 
areas such as protection for those vulnerable to family and 
sexual violence.
Appendix E: Bougainville
Australia is helping to develop a functional law and justice 
system in the Autonomous Region of Bougainville as the 
2015–20 window for a referendum on its future political 
status approaches.
A key need after the bitter 1988–1997 conflict has been 
to re-entrench civil authority, embed the rule of law, and 
provide mechanisms for dealing with disputes and crime. 
Continuing stability will be underpinned by improved access 
to and delivery of justice. The 2001 peace agreement formally 
ending the conflict and the 2005 Bougainville Constitution 
included arrangements to set up the Bougainville Police 
Service (BPS) to operate as part of, but autonomously from, 
the RPNGC. Although Bougainville hasn’t accepted full 
policing powers and functions from the national government 
yet, a fledging BPS comprising about 150 officers has been 
established in several districts and the urban centres of 
Arawa, Buin and Buka. Community confidence in the BPS is 
patchy, and it needs support and development to meet its 
responsibility to effectively and impartially preserve peace 
and good order, and to maintain and enforce national and 
Bougainville laws—partly due to lingering crisis-era fault-lines 
and pressures, such as the availability of weapons.
Complementing the conventional BPS, about 350 community 
auxiliary police are drawn from the areas where they serve 
work with village leaders and courts to deliver local-level 
dispute resolution and conflict mediation. Established in 
1999, even before the peace agreement, these officials aim 
to fill the gap in safety, security and crime prevention and to 
30 Special Report
Police aren’t the only institution responsible for public 
order in PNG. Under section 204 of the Constitution, PNG’s 
Governor-General can accept the cabinet’s recommendation 
to call out the PNG Defence Force to aid the police in keeping 
or restoring public order for a specified period—for example, 
for an impending event such as an election, to protect 
nationally vital economic infrastructure, or in the event of a 
specific major disturbance.
In a few instances, the national government has also 
exercised its emergency powers under section 228, for 
example by suspending the provincial government, declaring 
a state of emergency, mobilising the PNG Defence Force and 
the Corrections Service to assist the police, and installing 
an administrator to cope with a breakdown of governance 
and order in the Southern Highlands from August 2006 to 
February 2007.
Appendix F: Public order policing
The RPNGC’s Special Services Division is responsible for 
public order policing in PNG. The division numbers around 
600, or a tenth of the RPNGC.
The Special Services Division has 20 paramilitary mobile 
squads, each comprising 30 personnel. These units can 
be grouped for larger operations. The division is run 
semi-autonomously from McGregor Police Barracks on the 
outskirts of Port Moresby.
Australia has provided some training to the division in the 
past, including training on operational command principles. 
Australia has no operational involvement with the division, 
although future division members pass though Bomana 
Police College.
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12. 1974, 2020—Commissioner RPNGC; Law and Justice Sector 
Annual Performance Report  2013. Annual current wastage: 
AFP estimate.
13. Law and Justice Sector Annual Performance Report  2013, p. 57 
(Table A).
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Notes
1. World Bank, Crimes and disputes: missed opportunities and 
insights from a national data collection effort in Papua New 
Guinea, 2014, p. 7. Experts consulted for this report believe 
that this figure massively under-reports the problem.
2. Although synthetic drug labs haven’t been reported yet, 
PNG could potentially become a producer, given its growing 
manufacturing sector, its weak legislation against precursor 
substances, suspected links between international criminals 
and some PNG businesses, and shipping links between PNG 
and smaller Australian ports.
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and Justice Sector Annual Performance Report  2013, tables 15 
and 16. 
7.  Police brutality isn’t always punished. For example, a PNG 
judge complained that only two of seven officers suspected 
of slashing the Achilles tendons of 74 men accused of 
participating in a Port Moresby fight last year had been 
charged, and no-one had been convicted.
8. For example, this squad was very poorly funded until last 
year, when it received an increase of about $0.5 million for its 
work.
9. PNG’s National Security Policy, released in December 2013, 
lists law and order, corruption and human rights abuses as 
priority 1 national security threats.
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